Patterns for Representing FMEA in Formal Specification of Control Systems by Romanovsky A
  
COMPUTING 
SCIENCE 
Patterns for Representing FMEA in Formal Specification of Control 
Systems 
 
 
Ilya Lopatkin, Alexei Iliasov, Alexander Romanovsky, Yuliya 
Prokhorova and Elena Troubitsyna 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 
 
No. CS-TR-1261 July 2011 
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 
              
 
No. CS-TR-1261  July, 2011 
 
Patterns for Representing FMEA in Formal Specification of 
Control Systems 
 
I. Lopatkin, A. Iliasov, A. Romanovsky, Y. Prokhorova and E. Troubitsyna 
 
Abstract 
 
Failure Modes and Effect analysis (FMEA) is a widely used technique for inductive 
safety analysis. FMEA provides engineers with valuable information about failure 
modes of system components as well as procedures for error detection and recovery. 
In this paper we propose an approach that facilitates representation of FMEA results 
in formal Event-B specifications of control systems. We define a number of patterns 
for representing requirements derived from FMEA in formal system model in Event-
B. The patterns help the developers to trace the requirements and allow them to 
increase automation of formal system development by refinement. Our approach is 
illustrated by an example - a sluice system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2011 Newcastle University. 
Printed and published by Newcastle University, 
Computing Science, Claremont Tower, Claremont Road, 
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, England. 
Bibliographical details 
 
LOPATKIN, I., ILIASOV, A., ROMANOVSKY, A.,  PROKHOROVA, Y.,  TROUBITSYNA, E 
 
Patterns for Representing FMEA in Formal Specification of Control Systems  
[By]  I. Lopatkin, A. Iliasov, A. Romanovsky, Y. Prokhorova, E. Troubitsyna 
Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle University: Computing Science, 2011. 
 
(Newcastle University, Computing Science, Technical Report Series, No. CS-TR-1261) 
 
Added entries 
NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY 
Computing Science. Technical Report Series.  CS-TR-1261 
Abstract 
Failure Modes and Effect analysis (FMEA) is a widely used technique for inductive safety analysis. FMEA 
provides engineers with valuable information about failure modes of system components as well as procedures for 
error detection and recovery. In this paper we propose an approach that facilitates representation of FMEA results 
in formal Event-B specifications of control systems. We define a number of patterns for representing requirements 
derived from FMEA in formal system model in Event-B. The patterns help the developers to trace the 
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illustrated by an example - a sluice system. 
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Abstract — Failure Modes and Effect analysis (FMEA) is a 
widely used technique for inductive safety analysis. FMEA 
provides engineers with valuable information about failure 
modes of system components as well as procedures for error 
detection and recovery. In this paper we propose an approach 
that facilitates representation of FMEA results in formal 
Event-B specifications of control systems. We define a number 
of patterns for representing requirements derived from FMEA 
in formal system model in Event-B. The patterns help the 
developers to trace the requirements and allow them to 
increase automation of formal system development by 
refinement. Our approach is illustrated by an example - a 
sluice system. 
Keywords - formal specification; Event-B; FMEA; patterns; 
safety; control systems 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Formal modelling and verification are valuable for 
ensuring system dependability. However, often formal 
development process is perceived as being too complex to be 
deployed in industrial engineering process. Hence, there is a 
clear need for methods that facilitate adopting of formal 
modelling techniques and increase productivity of their use. 
Reliance on patterns – the generic solutions for certain 
typical problems – facilitates system engineering because it 
allows the developers to document the best practices and 
reuse previous knowledge. However, patterns defined for 
formal system development, e.g., by Hoang et al. [17] focus 
on describing model manipulations only and do not provide 
the insight on how to derive a formal model from textual 
requirements description. The gap between requirements 
engineering and in particular safety analysis and formal 
development has a negative impact on requirements 
traceability and leaves the developers without the guidance 
on how to represent certain types of requirements in the 
formal model. 
In this paper we propose an approach to automating 
formal system development by refinement in Event-B. We 
demonstrate how to connect formal modelling and 
refinement with Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) via a set of patterns. 
FMEA is a widely-used inductive technique for safety 
analysis [5,13,16]. It allows engineers to systematically study 
the causes of component faults, their global and local effects, 
and the means to cope with these faults. These requirements 
are invaluable for ensuring system dependability.  
In this paper we propose a set of patterns formalising the 
requirements derived from FMEA and enabling automatic 
transformation of system specification to incorporate these 
results. Our formal modelling framework is Event-B – a 
state-based formalism for formal system development by 
refinement and proof-based verification [1]. Event-B has a 
mature tool support – Rodin platform [4]. Currently, the 
framework is actively used by several industrial partners of 
EU FP7 project Deploy for developing dependable systems 
from various domains.  
The approach proposed in this paper allows us to 
automate the development process by requiring the user 
merely to choose the types of patterns corresponding to 
certain generic representation of FMEA results and 
instantiate these patterns with model-specific information. 
As a result of pattern application the model is automatically 
transformed to faithfully represent the desired requirements. 
In this paper we illustrate our approach with excerpts from 
the automated development of a sluice gate system [7]. 
Formal system development by refinement in Event-B 
allows us to verify (by proofs) preservation of safety 
invariants in presence of component failures identified by 
FMEA. We believe that the proposed approach provides a 
good support for formal development and improves 
traceability of safety requirements. 
II. MODELLING CONTROL SYSTEMS IN EVENT-B 
A. Event-B Overview 
The B Method is an approach to the industrial 
development of highly dependable control systems. The 
method has been successfully used in the development of 
several complex real-life applications [9]. Event-B [1] is a 
specialization of the B Method aimed at facilitating 
modelling parallel, distributed and reactive systems. The 
Rodin platform provides an automated support for 
modelling and verification in Event-B [4].  
In Event-B system models are defined using the Abstract 
Machine Notation. An abstract machine encapsulates the 
state (the variables) of a model and defines operations on its 
state. 
The machine is uniquely identified by its name 
MACHINE Name. The state variables of the machine are 
declared in the VARIABLES clause and initialized in the 
INITIALISATION event. The variables are strongly typed by 
constraining predicates of invariants given in the 
INVARIANTS clause. Usually the invariants also define 
the properties of the system that should be preserved during 
system execution. The data types and constants of the model 
are defined in a separate component called CONTEXT. The 
behaviour of the system is defined by a number of atomic 
events specified in the EVENTS clause. An event is defined 
as follows: 
 
 E = WHERE g THEN S END 
 
where the guard g is a conjunction of predicates defined 
over the state variables, and the action S is an assignment to 
the state variables. 
The guard defines when the event is enabled. If several 
events are enabled simultaneously then any of them can be 
chosen for execution non-deterministically. If none of the 
events is enabled then the system deadlocks. 
In general, the action of an event is a composition of 
variable assignments executed simultaneously. Variable 
assignments can be either deterministic or non-
deterministic. The deterministic assignment is denoted as 
x := E(v), where x is a state variable and E(v) is an 
expression over the state variables v. The non-deterministic 
assignment can be denoted as x :∈ S or x :| Q(v, x′), where S 
is a set of values and Q(v, x′) is a predicate. As a result of 
the non-deterministic assignment, x gets any value from S or 
it obtains such a value x′ that Q(v, x′) is satisfied. 
The main development methodology of Event-B is 
refinement. Refinement formalises model-driven 
development and allows us to develop systems correct-by-
construction. Each refinement transforms the abstract 
specification to gradually introduce implementation details. 
For a refinement step to be valid, every possible execution 
of the refined machine must correspond to some execution 
of the abstract machine. 
The formal semantics of Event-B [1] provides us with a 
foundation for rigorous reasoning about system correctness. 
The consistency (invariant preservation) and well-
definedness of Event-B models as well as correctness of 
refinement steps is demonstrated by discharging proof 
obligations. The Rodin platform [4], a tool supporting 
Event-B, automatically generates the required proof 
obligations and attempts to automatically prove them. 
Sometimes it requires user assistance by invoking its 
interactive prover. However, in general the tool achieves 
high level of automation (usually over 90%) in proving.  
Next we describe specification and refinement of control 
systems in Event-B. It follows the specification pattern 
proposed earlier [11]. 
B. Modelling Control Systems 
The control systems are usually cyclic, i.e., at periodic 
intervals they get input from sensors, process it and output 
the new values to the actuators. In our specification the 
sensors and actuators are represented by the corresponding 
state variables. We follow the systems approach, i.e., model 
the controller together with its environment – plant. This 
allows us to explicitly state the assumptions about 
environment behaviour. At each cycle the plant assigns the 
variables modelling the sensor readings. They depend on the 
physical process of the plant and the current state of the 
actuators. In its turn, the controller reads the variables 
modelling sensors and assigns the variables modelling the 
actuators. We assume that the reaction of the controller 
takes negligible amount of time and hence the controller can 
react properly on changes of the plant state. 
In this paper, we focus on modelling failsafe control 
systems. A system is failsafe if it can be put into a safe but 
non-operational state to preclude an occurrence of a hazard.  
The general specification pattern for modelling a failsafe 
control system in Event-B is shown in Fig. 1.  
 
machine Abs_M 
 
sees Abs_C 
 
variables flag Failure Stop 
 
invariants 
     flag ∈ PHASE 
     Failure ∈ BOOL 
     Stop ∈ BOOL 
     Failure=FALSE ⇒ 
                       Stop=FALSE 
     Failure=TRUE ∧ flag≠CONT 
                ⇒  Stop=TRUE 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
       flag ≔ ENV 
       Failure ≔ FALSE 
       Stop ≔  FALSE 
  end 
 
  event Environment 
    where 
       flag = ENV 
       Failure = FALSE 
       Stop = FALSE 
    then 
       flag ≔ DET 
  end 
 
  event Detection 
    where 
       flag = DET 
       Failure = FALSE 
       Stop = FALSE 
    then 
       flag ≔ CONT 
       Failure :∈ BOOL 
  end 
  event Normal_Operation 
    where 
       flag = CONT 
       Failure = FALSE 
       Stop = FALSE 
    then 
       flag ≔ PRED 
  end 
 
  event Error_Handling 
    any res 
    where 
       flag = CONT 
       Failure = TRUE 
       Stop = FALSE 
       res∈BOOL 
    then 
       flag ≔ PRED 
       Stop ≔ res 
       Failure ≔ res 
  end 
 
  event Prediction 
    where 
       flag = PRED 
       Failure = FALSE 
       Stop = FALSE 
    then 
       flag ≔ ENV 
  end 
end 
 
Figure 1.  An abstract specification of a control system. 
Abstract model Abs_M represents the overall behaviour 
of the system as an interleaving between the events 
modelling the plant and the controller. The behaviour of the 
controller has the following stages: Detection; Control 
(Normal Operation or Error Handling); Prediction. The 
stages are defined in enumerated set PHASE: {ENV, DET, 
CONT, PRED}. Variable flag of type PHASE models the 
current stage. 
In the model invariant we declare the types of the 
variables and define the conditions when the system is 
operational or stopped. The system must be in operation if it 
did not fail, and it must stop at the end of the current cycle if 
a failure occurred. 
Events Environment, Normal_Operation and 
Prediction are the very abstract specifications of events 
(essentially placeholders) modelling environment behaviour, 
controller reaction and computation of the next expected 
states of system components correspondingly. These events 
are defined in details in the consequent refinement steps. 
Event Detection non-deterministically models the outcome 
of error detection by assigning value TRUE to variable 
Failure in case of an error and FALSE otherwise. As a 
result of error recovery, abstractly modelled by event 
Error_Handling, the normal system operation can be 
resumed. In this case, the value of Failure is changed to 
FALSE. However, if the error recovery is unsuccessful, 
variable Stop obtains value TRUE and the system shuts 
down, i.e., the specification deadlocks.  
In the next section we demonstrate how to arrive at a 
detailed specification of a control system by refinement in 
Event-B. We use the sluice gate control system to exemplify 
the refinement process. 
III. REFINEMENT OF CONTROL SYSTEMS IN EVENT-B 
A. The Sluice Gate Control System 
The general specification pattern given in Fig.1 defines 
the initial abstract specification for any typical control 
system, including the sluice gate control system that we 
describe next. The sluice gate system shown in Fig.2 is a 
sluice connecting areas with dramatically different pressures 
[7]. The pressure difference makes it unsafe to open a door 
unless the pressure is levelled between the areas connected 
by the sluice door. The purpose of the system is to adjust the 
pressure in the sluice area. Such a system can be deployed, 
e.g., on a submarine to allow divers to get into the sea when 
the submarine is submerged. The sluice gate system consists 
of two doors - door1 and door2 that can be operated 
independently of each other and a pressure chamber pump 
that changes the pressure in the sluice area. There are the 
following safety requirements imposed on the system. A 
door may be opened only if the pressure in the locations it 
connects is equalized. Since the pressure of two 
environments is different, at most one door can be opened at 
any moment. The pressure chamber pump can only be 
switched on when both doors are closed. 
The sluice gate system is equipped with the following 
sensors and actuators: 
• three pressure sensors return the current pressure 
values in the room and in the two areas adjacent to 
the room; 
• two door position sensors give the current positions 
of two doors respectively. Each sensor has a cold 
spare – a redundant sensor to which the system can 
automatically switch; 
• two switch sensors are attached to each door – these 
signal when the door is fully opened or closed; 
• pressure chamber pump actuator changes the 
pressure inside the room; 
• two-way door motors open and close the doors. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Sluice gate system. 
The system has physical redundancy (the door position 
sensors have spares) and information redundancy (when the 
doors are fully opened or closed, the door position sensor 
readings should be in accordance with the switch sensors). 
B. Introducing Error Detection and Recovery by 
Refinement 
At the first refinement step we aim at introducing 
models of system components, error detection procedures 
for their failure modes, as well as error masking and 
recovery actions. We postpone refinement of the normal 
functional behaviour of the system until the next refinement 
step.  
To systematically define failure modes, detection and 
recovery procedures, for each component we conduct 
Failure Modes and Effect Analysis. FMEA [5,13,16] is a 
well-known inductive safety analysis technique. For each 
system component it defines its possible failure modes, 
local and system effects of component failures, as well as 
detection and recovery procedures. For instance, on Fig.3 is 
an excerpt from FMEA of the Door1 component of our 
sluice system.  
The Door1 component is composed of several hardware 
units. Their failures correspond to the failure modes of the 
Door1 component. For the sake of brevity, we omit showing 
FMEA of all failure modes of Door1 and next discuss how to 
specify error detection and recovery for the failure mode 
described in the FMEA table in Fig.3. 
Component Door1  
Failure mode Door position sensor value is different from the 
door closed sensor value 
Possible cause Failure of position sensor or closed sensor 
Local effects Sensor readings are not equal in corresponding 
states 
System effects Switch to degraded or manual mode or shut down 
Detection Comparison of the values received from position 
and closed sensors 
Remedial action Retry three times. If failure persists then switch to 
redundant sensor, diagnose motor failure. If 
failure still persists, switch to manual mode and 
raise the alarm. If no redundant sensor is 
available then switch to manual mode and raise 
the alarm. 
Figure 3.  FMEA table 
In the refined specification we introduce the variables 
representing the units of Door1: door position 
sensor - door1_position_sensor, motor - door1_motor and 
door opened and closed sensors - door1_opened_sensor, 
door1_closed_sensor. In event Environment we introduce 
the actions that change the values of door1_position_sensor, 
door1_closed_sensor and door1_opened_sensor. In event 
Normal_Operation we define the action that non-
deterministically changes the value of door1_motor. 
We refine event Detection by splitting it into a group of 
events responsible for the detection of each mode of failures 
of all system components. We introduce variable door1_fail 
to designate a failure of the door component. This failure is 
assigned TRUE when any failure mode of Door1 component 
is detected. Event Detection_door1_checks included in this 
group contains the actual checks for value ranges and 
consistency: 
 
event Detection_Door1_checks 
    where 
      flag = DET 
      Stop = FALSE 
    then 
      door1_position_sensor_pred ≔ bool((door1_position_sensor < 
             d1_exp_min ∨ door1_position_sensor > d1_exp_max) ∧ 
               door1_sensor_disregard=FALSE) 
      door1_closed_sensor_inconsistent ≔  
             bool(¬(door1_closed_sensor=TRUE ⇔    
                  (door1_position=0 ∨ door1_sensor_disregard=TRUE))) 
      <other checks> 
end 
 
Variables d1_exp_min and d1_exp_max are the new 
variables introduced to model the next expected sensor 
readings. These variables are updated in the Prediction 
event. Event Detection_Door1 combines the results of the 
checks of the status of the door1 component. 
The failure of component Door1 is detected if any check 
of the error detection events for any of its failure modes finds 
a discrepancy between a fault free and the observed states. In 
a similar manner, the system failure is detected if a failure of 
any of system components – Door1, Door2 or 
PressurePump is detected, as specified in event 
Detection_Fault. 
 
event Detection_Door1 
  where 
    flag = DET 
    Stop = FALSE 
  then 
    door1_fail ≔  bool( door1_position_sensor_pred=TRUE ∨ 
                        door1_closed_sensor_inconsistent=TRUE ∨  
                      <other check statuses>) 
end 
 
event Detection_Fault refines Detection 
  where 
    flag = DET 
    Stop = FALSE 
    door1_fail=TRUE ∨ door2_fail=TRUE ∨ pressure_fail = TRUE 
  with 
    Failure' Failure'=TRUE 
  then 
    flag ≔ CONT 
end 
 
Observe that by performing FMEA of all system 
components we obtain a systematic textual description of all 
procedures required to detect component errors and perform 
their recovery. We gradually by refinement introduce the 
specification of these requirements into the system model.  
While analysing the refined specification it is easy to 
note that there are several typical specification solutions 
called patterns that represent certain groups of requirements. 
This prompts the idea of creating an automated tool support 
that would automatically transform a specification by 
applying the patterns chosen and instantiated by the 
developer. In the next section we describe the essence and 
usage of such a tool. 
IV. PATTERNS AND TOOL FOR REPRESENTING RESULTS 
OF FMEA IN EVENT-B 
A. Patterns for Representing FMEA results 
Our approach aims at structuring and formalising FMEA 
results via a set of generic patterns. These patterns serve as a 
middle hand between informal requirements description and 
their formal Event-B model. 
While deriving the patterns we assume that the abstract 
system specification adheres to the generic pattern given in 
Fig.1 and components can be represented by the corresponding 
state variables. Our patterns establish a correspondence 
between the results of FMEA and the Event-B terms. 
We distinguish four groups of patterns: detection, 
recovery, prediction and invariants. The detection patterns 
reflect such generic mechanisms for error detection as 
discrepancy between the actual and expected component 
state, sensor reading outside of the feasible range etc. The 
recovery patterns include retry of actions or computations, 
switch to redundant components and safe shutdown. The 
prediction patterns represent the typical solutions for 
computing estimated states of components, e.g., using the 
underlying physical system dynamics or timing constraints. 
Finally, the invariant patterns are usually used in 
combination with other types of patterns to postulate how a 
model transformation affects the model invariant. This type 
contains safety and gluing invariant patterns. The safety 
invariant patterns define how safety conditions can be 
introduced into the model. The gluing invariant patterns 
depict the correspondence between the states of refined and 
abstract model.  
A pattern is a model transformation that upon 
instantiation adds or modifies certain elements of Event-B 
model. By elements we mean the terms of Event-B 
mathematical language such as variables, constants, 
invariants, events, guards etc. A pattern can add or modify 
several elements at once. Moreover, it can be composed of 
several other patterns. 
To illustrate how FMEA results can be interpreted 
according to the proposed types of patterns, let us consider 
FMEA of a door1 position sensor in Fig.4. 
 
Component Door1  
Failure mode Door position sensor value is different from the 
expected range of values 
Possible cause Failure of the position sensor 
Local effects Sensor reading is out of expected range 
System effects Switch to degraded or manual mode or shut down 
Detection Comparison of the received value with the 
predicted range of values 
Remedial action The same as for Fig.3 
Figure 4.  FMEA table for “out of predicted range” failure mode of a 
positioning sensor 
We map the FMEA table to a set of patterns which 
together represent the desired phenomena in the model. The 
patterns are shown in a declarative form for illustration 
purposes. The identifiers shown in brackets will be 
substituted by those given by a user during the pattern 
instantiation (see next sections). 
Firstly, our sensor is a value type sensor. Such an 
assumption leads to an introduction of a variable 
representing the value of the sensor by the Value sensor 
pattern: 
 
variables [sensor]_value 
invariants 
    [sensor]_value : NAT 
events 
    event INITIALISATION 
    then 
         [sensor]_value := 0 
    end 
end 
 
The value pattern creates a new variable, its typing 
invariant, and an initialisation action. To detect the failure 
mode, we use the Expected range pattern: 
 
variables 
    [component]_[sensor]_[error] 
    [component]_fail 
    [sensor]_exp_min 
    [sensor]_exp_max 
 
invariants 
    [component]_[sensor]_[error] : BOOL 
    [component]_fail : BOOL 
    [sensor]_exp_min : NAT 
    [sensor]_exp_max : NAT 
events 
    event Detection_[component]_checks 
    where 
      flag = DET 
      Stop = FALSE 
    then 
      [component]_[sensor]_[error] ≔ bool( 
                  [sensor]_value < [sensor]_exp_min ∨  
                  [sensor]_value > [sensor]_exp_max) 
      <other checks> 
    end 
 
    event Detection_[component] 
    where 
       flag = DET 
       Stop = FALSE 
    then 
       [component]_fail ≔  bool([component]_[sensor]_[error] ∨ 
                      <other check statuses>) 
    end 
end 
 
This pattern adds the detection events, the necessary 
variables, and ensures that the detection checks added 
previously by other patterns are preserved (informally shown 
in angle brackets). The expected range of values used by this 
pattern must be assigned by some event on the previous 
control cycle. To ensure that such assignment exists in the 
model, the Expected range pattern instantiates the Range 
prediction pattern: 
 
variables 
    [sensor]_exp_min 
    [sensor]_exp_max 
invariants 
    [sensor]_exp_min : NAT 
    [sensor]_exp_max : NAT 
 
events 
    event Prediction extends Prediction 
    then 
      [sensor]_exp_min:: NAT 
      [sensor]_exp_max:: NAT 
      <other sensor predictions> 
    end 
end 
 
This pattern leaves the prediction non-deterministic for 
further refinement because the actual prediction depends on 
the functionality of the system under development. 
Note how two previous patterns work with the same 
variables. In such case, only the first pattern to be 
instantiated actually creates variables as one would expect. 
The same applies to events, actions, guards etc. 
To connect the model created using patterns with the 
abstract level, we use the Gluing invariant pattern: 
 
variables 
    [component]_fail 
invariants 
    flag≠DET ⇒ (Failure=TRUE ⇔ [component]_fail=TRUE ∨ 
                                          <other component failures>) 
    flag≠CONT ⇒  ([component]_fail=TRUE ⇔  
                                     [component]_[sensor]_[error]=TRUE ∨ 
                                          <other sensor errors>) 
 
which links the sensor error to the component failure, and 
contributes the component failure to the gluing invariant thus 
preserving the refinement relation. 
For our example, the remedial action can be divided into 
three actions. The first action retries reading the sensor for a 
specified number of times (Retry recovery pattern). The 
second action disables the faulty component and enables its 
spare (Component redundancy recovery pattern). The third 
action, when the spare component is failed either, is to 
switch the system from operational state to non-operational 
one (Safe stop recovery pattern). The system effect can be 
represented as a safety property (Safety invariant pattern). 
We omit showing all the patterns due to the lack of space. 
As shown in the example, each FMEA field is mapped to 
one or more patterns. Patterns have interdependencies 
between them and they are composable. For instance, the 
recovery patterns have to have references to the variables set 
by the sensor, and thus depend on the results of the Value 
sensor pattern, the Expected value detection pattern needs to 
instantiate the Range prediction pattern to have the values 
predicted from the previous control cycle. Each pattern 
creates Event-B elements specific to the pattern, and requires 
elements created by other patterns. Such interdependency 
and mapping to FMEA is schematically shown on Fig.5. 
Note how the Expected range pattern creates new constants 
and variables (dark grey rectangle, variable [sensor]_exp_min 
from the example) and will instantiate the Value sensor 
pattern to create the elements it depends on (light grey 
rectangle, variable [sensor]_value from the example). 
B. Automation of Patterns Implementation 
The automation of the pattern instantiation is 
implemented as a tool plug-in for the Rodin platform [4]. 
Technically, each pattern is a program written in a 
simplified Eclipse Object Language (EOL). It is a general 
purpose programming language in the family of languages 
of the Epsilon framework [10] which operates on EMF [3] 
objects. It is a natural choice for automating model 
transformations since Event-B is interoperable with EMF. 
The tool extends the application of EOL to Event-B 
models: it adds simple user interface features for 
instantiation, extends the Epsilon user input facility with 
discovery of the Event-B elements, and provides a library of 
Event-B and FMEA-specific transformations. 
To apply a pattern, a user chooses a target model and a 
pattern to instantiate. A pattern application may require user 
input: variable names or types, references to existing 
elements of the model etc. The input is performed through a 
series of simple dialogs. 
The requested input comprises the applicability 
conditions of the pattern. In many cases it is known that 
instantiation of a pattern depends primarily on the results of 
a more basic pattern. In those cases the former directly 
instantiates the latter and reuses the user input. Also more 
generally, if several patterns require the same unit of user 
input then the composition of such patterns will ask for such 
input only once. Typically, a single pattern instantiation 
requires up to 3-4 inputs. 
 
 
Figure 5.  FMEA representation patterns 
If a pattern only requires user input and creates new 
elements then its imperative form is close to declarative as 
shown in the example below: 
 
var flag: Variable= 
chooseOrCreateVariable("Phase variable"); 
createTypingInvariant(flag, "PHASE"); 
var failure: Variable = 
chooseOrCreateVariable("Failure variable"); 
createTypingInvariant(failure, "BOOL"); 
newEvent("Detection") 
 .addGuard("phase_grd", flag.name + " = DET") 
 .addGuard("failure_grd", failure.name + " = 
FALSE") 
 .addAction("phase_act", flag.name + " := 
CONT") 
 .addAction("failure_act", failure.name + " :: 
BOOL"); 
 
Here the tool will ask the user to select two variables (or 
creates new ones). It will create typing invariants and a new 
model event with several guards and actions. Next we 
illustrate the use of the tool in the refinement of our sluice 
gate case study. 
V. AUTOMATED REFINEMENT PROCESS 
A. Automated refinement step 
In section 3 we presented an excerpt showing how to 
(manually) model unreliable positioning sensor and error 
recovery. In this section we demonstrate how to automate the 
first refinement step. Fig.4 shows FMEA table for the “out of 
predicted range” failure mode of the door position sensor. 
Below we show an excerpt from a model obtained 
automatically via instantiation and application of several 
patterns. 
 
variables door1_position_sensor, door1_fail, 
door1_position_sensor_pred, d1_exp_max d1_exp_min, retry 
 
event RetryPosition 
  where 
    flag = CONT 
    door1_position_sensor_abs = TRUE ∨  
       door1_position_sensor_pred = TRUE 
    retry<3 
  then 
    door1_position_sensor_abs ≔ FALSE 
    door1_position_sensor_pred ≔ FALSE 
    door1_fail_masked ≔ bool(  
       door1_opened_sensor_inconsistent=TRUE ∨  
       door1_closed_sensor_inconsistent=TRUE) 
    retry ≔ retry + 1 
end 
event Detection_Door1_checks 
  where 
    flag = DET 
    Stop = FALSE 
  then 
    door1_position_sensor_pred ≔ bool(  
           (door1_position_sensor < d1_exp_min ∨ 
           door1_position_sensor > d1_exp_max) ∧ 
                door1_sensor_disregard=FALSE) 
    <other checks> 
end 
event SafeStop refines ErrorHandling 
  where 
    flag = CONT 
    (door1_fail=TRUE ∧ door1_fail_masked=TRUE) ∨ 
                  door2_fail=TRUE ∨ pressure_fail=TRUE 
    Stop = FALSE 
  with 
    res=TRUE 
  then 
    flag ≔ PRED 
    Stop ≔ TRUE 
end 
 
Upon instantiation, the Expected value detection and 
Value sensor patterns ensure that the necessary variables 
exist, and the detection events are appropriately modified. 
The Expected value detection pattern also instantiates the 
Range prediction pattern which adds a non-deterministic 
assignment to event Prediction. The Retry recovery pattern 
adds the RetryPosition event. This event masks the sensor 
failure for the current control cycle, and counts the number 
of retries. Upon an occurrence of a sensor failure for a given 
number of times (3 in this example), the system has to shut 
down. This is achieved by the event SafeStop, which is 
generated by the pattern with the same name.  
The Gluing invariant and Safety invariant patterns 
generate the gluing and safety invariants correspondingly. 
The gluing invariants establish correspondence between 
abstract and refined states. In particular, it stipulates the 
relationships between the failures of all system components 
and the overall system failure, as well as between 
component failure and the results of error detection of their 
constituent units. As shown below, the safety invariant 
states that a door1 failure must lead to a safe stop. 
invariants 
  @glue  flag≠DET ⇒ (Failure=TRUE ⇔ door1_fail=TRUE ∨ 
door2_fail=TRUE ∨ pressure_fail=TRUE) 
  @glue_door1_fail  flag≠CONT ⇒  (door1_fail=TRUE ⇔  
                    door1_position_sensor_abs=TRUE ∨ 
                    door1_position_sensor_pred=TRUE ∨  
                    door1_opened_sensor_inconsistent=TRUE ∨ 
                    door1_closed_sensor_inconsistent=TRUE) 
  @safety  door1_fail=TRUE ∧ flag≠CONT ∧ flag≠DET ⇒  
Stop=TRUE 
B. Further Refinement Steps 
As the result of the first refinement step we have 
obtained a specification that contains the detailed 
description of the FMEA-derived detection and recovery 
procedures. However, the normal control operations are 
modelled non-deterministically. In the second refinement 
step we introduce the detailed specification of the normal 
control logic. This refinement step leads to refining event 
Normal_Operation into a group of events that model the 
actual control algorithm. These events model opening and 
closing the doors as well as activation of the pressure 
chamber pump.  
Refinement of the normal control operation results in 
restricting non-determinism. This allows us to formulate 
safety invariants that our system guarantees: 
 
failure = FALSE ∧ door1_position = door1_position ⇒ 
    door1_position = 0 
failure = FALSE ∧ (door1_position > 0 ∨ 
    door1_motor=MOTOR_OPEN) ⇒ pressure_value = 
    PRESSURE_OUTSIDE 
failure = FALSE ∧ (door2_position > 0 ∨ 
    door2_motor=MOTOR_OPEN) ⇒ pressure_value = 
    PRESSURE_INSIDE 
failure = FALSE ∧ pressure_value ≠ PRESSURE_INSIDE ∧ 
    pressure_value ≠ PRESSURE_OUTSIDE  ⇒ door1_position=0 ∧ 
    door2_position=0 
failure = FALSE ∧ pump≠PUMP_OFF ⇒ (door1_position=0 ∧ 
    door2_position=0) 
 
These invariants formally define the safety requirements 
informally described in subsection 3.A. While verifying the 
correctness of this refinement step we formally ensure (by 
proofs) that safety is preserved while the system is 
operational. 
At the consequent refinement steps we introduce the 
error recovery procedures. This allows us to distinguish 
between criticality of failures and ensure that if a non-
critical failure occurs then the system can still remain 
operational. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
A. Related Work 
Integration of the safety analysis techniques with formal 
system modelling has attracted a significant research 
attention over the last few years. There are a number of 
approaches that aim at direct integration of the safety 
analysis techniques into formal system development. For 
instance, the work of Ortmeier et al. [14] focuses on using 
statecharts to formally represent the system behaviour. It 
aims at combining the results of FMEA and FTA to model 
the system behaviour and reason about component failures 
as well as overall system safety. Our approach is different – 
we aim at automating the formal system development with 
the set of patterns instantiated by FMEA results.  The 
application of instantiated patterns automatically transforms 
a model to represent the results of FMEA in a coherent and 
complete way. The available automatic tool support for the 
top-down Event-B modelling as well as for plug-in 
instantiation and application ensures better scalability of our 
approach. 
In our previous work, we have proposed an approach to 
integrating safety analysis into formal system development 
within the Action System formalism [18]. Since Event-B 
incorporates the ideas of Action Systems into the B Method, 
the current work is a natural extension of our previous 
results. 
The research conducted by Troubitsyna [19] aims at 
demonstrating how to use statecharts as a middle ground 
between safety analysis and formal system specifications in 
the B Method. This work has inspired our idea of deriving 
Event-B patterns. 
Another strand of research aims at defining general 
guidelines for ensuring dependability of software-intensive 
systems. For example, Hatebur and Heisel [6] have derived 
patterns for representing dependability requirements and 
ensuring their traceability in the system development. In our 
approach we rely on specific safety analysis techniques 
rather than on the requirements analysis in general to derive 
guidelines for modelling dependable systems. 
B. Conclusions 
In this paper we have made two main technical 
contributions. Firstly, we derived a set of generic patterns 
for elicitation and structuring of safety and fault tolerance 
requirements from FMEA. Secondly, we created an 
automatic tool support that enables interactive pattern 
instantiation and automatic model transformation to capture 
these requirements in formal system development. Our 
methodology facilitates requirements elicitation as well as 
supports traceability of safety and fault tolerance 
requirements within the formal development process. 
Our approach enables guided formal development 
process. It supports the reuse of knowledge obtained during 
formal system development and verification. For instance, 
while deriving the patterns we have analysed and 
generalised our previous work on specifying various control 
systems [8,11,12].  
We believe that the proposed approach and tool support 
provide a valuable support for formal modelling that is 
traditionally perceived as too cumbersome for engineers.  
Firstly, we define a generic specification structure. 
Secondly, we automate specification of a large part of 
modelling decisions. We believe that our work can 
potentially enhance productivity of system development and 
improve completeness of formal models. 
As a future work we are planning to create a library of 
domain-specific patterns and automate their application. 
This would results in achieving even greater degree of 
development automation and knowledge reuse. 
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